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DO SEC’S 10B5-1 SAFE HARBOR RULES 
NEED TO BE REWRITTEN? 
Taylan Mavruk and H. Nejat Seyhun 
We examine the profitability of insider trading under SEC 
Rule 10b5-1 plans. The plans do work to prevent some 
informed trading. However, on average, insider trading 
under the safe harbor plans appears to be motivated by 
material non-public information. We propose some policy 
changes to tighten the rule and enable separation of informed 
and uninformed insider trading. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5 
make it unlawful for corporations to use any manipulative 
scheme or to engage in omission of any material fact in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security around 
the time of company filings.1 The SEC has used this as a 
statutory hook to prohibit illegal insider trading.2 Since 
October 2000, SEC Rule 10b5-1 has provided an exception to 
this rule by allowing insiders to set up trading plans in 
advance of actual trading.3 Since planned trades are set up 
in advance of subsequent trading, they allow insiders to buy 
and sell shares despite possessing material non-public 
information at the time of the trade while providing an 
affirmative safe harbor defense against allegations of illegal 
insider trading. However, these plans are not foolproof. Both 
 
1 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2014). 
2 See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014). We will also refer to Rule 10b5-1 as 
the “safe harbor rule.” 
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finance and legal experts suspect that significant loopholes 
exist in the design and execution of these plans and that the 
plans are being abused to hide more informed insider 
trading.4 
One potential concern with Rule 10b5-1 is that executive 
insiders can possess material non-public information at the 
time they set up these trading plans.5 If true, such 
possession would undermine the entire foundation for the 
SEC Rule, which rests on a requirement that executive 
insiders set up the plans before the executive insider 
becomes aware of such information. A second concern is that 
executive insiders can incorporate their material non-public 
information into the plans’ trading formulas, or that they can 
subsequently cancel or modify their existing 10b5-1 plans or 
set up additional new plans as they come into material non-
public information.6 If so, these plans would not provide 
substantive constraints on insider trading activity. A third 
concern is that since executive insiders do not need to 
disclose either the existence or the details of the plan under 
the current rules, regulatory agencies cannot verify that 
insiders are actually complying with their own specific plan 
 
4 Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 
55 MGMT. SCI. 224, 224–25, 235–36 (2009); M. Todd Henderson et al., 
Hiding in Plain Sight: Can Disclosure Enhance Insiders’ Trade Returns? 2, 
3, 20 (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 411, 2012), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art 
icle=1646&context=law_and_economics [http://perma.cc/2DNF-85Z2]. See 
also Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Opening Remarks Before the 15th Annual NASPP Conference 
(Oct. 10, 2007) (manuscript at 2–3), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2007/spch101007lct.htm [http://perma.cc/82GL-9Z8E]. 
5 Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Trading Plans Under Fire: Despite 
2007 Warning, Experts Say Loopholes Remain for Corporate Insiders, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241 
27887324296604578177734024394950 [http://perma.cc/3UFR-LWPA]. 
6 See id. 
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rules instead of improvising over time based on subsequent 
material non-public information.7 
Previous studies have reported that insider trading by 
those with 10b5-1 plans show significant abnormal 
profitability consistent with concerns that these plans are 
not used to execute liquidity-motivated transactions only.8 In 
this Article, we provide additional evidence on the 
profitability of insider trading with 10b5-1 plans, offer more 
detailed analyses of the reasons for profitability of insider 
trading, and provide specific policy prescriptions to prevent 
using these plans to hide profitable transactions. 
Our results indicate that the initial transactions from the 
plans show significant abnormal profitability, indicating that 
many plans are set up at a time when insiders possess 
material non-public information. Second, our results suggest 
that irregularities in trading patterns—both irregular 
trading intervals as well as irregular trading volumes—are 
associated with greater abnormal profitability. This finding 
is consistent with the concern that insiders could be 
modifying, canceling, or setting up new plans which deviate 
from their original planned trades after they subsequently 
acquire material non-public information. 
To prevent abuse of the SEC’s safe harbor rule, we 
propose that 10b5-1 plans satisfy four additional constraints. 
First, we propose that the first trade from a proper plan 
must be scheduled no less than six months after the plan is 
filed. This rule will increase the likelihood that even if the 
plan is set up when insiders possess material non-public 
information, the scheduled trades will not be able to exploit 
insiders’ informational advantages. Second, we propose that 
if the plan is modified or a new plan is created, the six-
 
7 See id. See also Jane Sasseen, The SEC is Eyeing Insider Stock 
Sales, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 18, 2007), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/bw/stories/2007-03-18/the-sec-is-eyeing-insider-stock-sales 
[http://perma.cc/B7RV-GQ98]. 
8 Jagolinzer, supra note 4, at 228–30; Henderson et al., supra note 4, 
at 13–17, 19. 
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month rule must apply anew to any subsequent planned 
trades. Third, we propose that the SEC repeal its permission 
regarding prices, formulas, and computer programs and 
insist that safe harbor plans’ trading decisions cannot be 
conditioned on future stock price or market conditions. 
Instead, insiders must simply submit the number of shares 
to be purchased or sold and the dates of these proposed 
transactions. Fourth, we propose that the details of safe 
harbor plans must be disclosed publicly so that both the SEC 
and investors can verify that the executives are actually 
complying with their own proposed rules. 
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows: Part 
II presents the background and existing literature 
examining insider trading within Rule 10b5-1. Part III 
describes the data, provides the summary statistics, and 
presents our method. Part IV presents the main results 
regarding the effects of Rule 10b5-1 on insider-trading 
behavior and returns. Part V discusses the policy 
implications of our findings. Part VI presents our 
conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Background 
The SEC created Rule 10b5-1 in October 2000 to allow 
insiders to better diversify their holdings by providing an 
affirmative legal defense for trades that are pre-planned at a 
time when insiders did not have material, non-public 
information.9 The affirmative defense provides that any 
insider who prearranged a trading plan for future trades will 
not be liable for insider trading even if she is aware of the 
material non-public information at the time trades are 
executed, as long as she was not aware of this information at 
the time she arranged the trading plan.10 
 
9 See Thomsen, supra note 4. 
10 See id. 
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In order for a plan to qualify as safe harbor, the SEC has 
mandated three specific conditions. First, insiders must have 
entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell a security 
and provided written instructions to do so prior to becoming 
aware of material non-public information. Second, insiders 
must either specify the amount, price, and date of trade, or 
provide a formula, algorithm, or a computer program to 
determine those parameters. Such formula, algorithm, or 
computer program cannot permit the insider to exercise 
subsequent influence on the execution of these trades. Third, 
insiders must demonstrate that all such purchases and sales 
must have occurred pursuant to the plan.11 
The SEC reasons that, by constraining insiders to follow 
pre-planned rules, insiders would be relieved from the 
burden of having to defend against allegations of abusing 
their subsequent informational advantages. Thus, trading 
plans under Rule 10b5-1 should lead to reduced litigation 
risk. Firms may also prefer to disclose insiders’ trades within 
Rule 10b5-1 to reduce legal risk.12 
From a logical perspective, the SEC’s three safe harbor 
requirements are quite problematic. The current rules allow 
insiders to provide a formula, an algorithm, or a computer 
program to generate trades. The SEC’s rules also allow 
 
11 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i) (2014). Planned trades do not affect 
insiders’ transactions outside the plan. Trades outside the plan do not 
have the safe harbor presumption. 
12 Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 13–17, 19. Henderson et al. argue 
that firms may voluntarily disclose information about insiders’ planned 
trades because disclosure of Rule 10b5-1 trades seems to increase legal 
protection. Their study shows that the decision to disclose 10b5-1 trading 
plans is more common for firms with higher overall litigation risk 
(measured by firm-specific volatility) and with greater potential for 
strategic trade by insiders. The decision to disclose is more common for 
firms with more financially sophisticated boards, larger institutional 
ownership, and greater analyst following. However, there can also be risks 
on the other side as well, namely entering into a plan and not carrying out 
all of the associated transactions due to changes in circumstances, since 
fewer than twenty-five percent of sales transactions are tagged with 10b5-
1 designation. 
MAVRUK & SEYHUN – FINAL  
No. 1:133] SEC’S 10B5-1 SAFE HARBOR RULES 139 
insiders to condition their trading decisions on the market 
price of the stock. Taken together, these conditions give 
insiders wide latitude to fully incorporate their material non-
public information right into the safe harbor plan’s trading 
formula.   
Some examples will be useful. Figure 1 shows a 
hypothetical trading plan, A, where the current stock price is 
$100 and the trading plan calls for no sales unless the stock 
price exceeds $125, and then planned sales ramp up rapidly. 
This plan would be consistent with insiders’ material, non-
public information which indicates that the stock price is not 
likely to fall, it is likely to remain between $100 and $120, 
and that any price at or over $120–$125 is likely to contain 
significant overvaluation and thus presents a good selling 
opportunity. 
 
Figure 1. Plan A Proposed Sales 
 
Figure 2 shows another hypothetical trading plan, B. 
Assume that current stock price is again $100 and the plan 
now calls for no sales if the stock prices equal or exceed $100, 
and then planned sales ramp up rapidly if the price falls 
significantly below $100. This price-quantity relation in this 
plan would suggest that insiders are worrying about a 























MAVRUK & SEYHUN – FINAL  
140 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
 
Figure 2. Plan B Proposed Sales 
 
Figure 3 shows another hypothetical trading plan, C. 
Assume that current stock price is still $100 and the plan 
now calls for no purchases if the stock prices equal or exceed 
$100, and then planned purchases ramp up rapidly if the 
price falls significantly below $85–$90. This price-quantity 
relation in this plan would suggest that insiders possess but 
have not yet made public some significant negative 
information. This negative information is likely to be 
temporary and its effects are expected to be reversed at a 
later date. By setting up a trading plan that triggers 
increased purchases below a limit price of $85–$90, insiders 
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Figure 3. Plan C Proposed Purchases 
   
Next, Figure 4 shows another hypothetical trading plan, 
D. The plan now calls 20,000 shares to be purchased per 
month if the stock prices equal or fall below $100. If the price 
kicks up significantly above $100, and then planned 
purchases taper off. At a price of $125 or above, the planned 
purchases stop. The price-quantity relation in this plan 
would suggest that insiders possess but have not made 
public some significant positive information. This positive 
information is likely to increase the stock prices up to 25% 
but not much beyond 25%. By setting up a trading plan that 
shuts off purchases at a limit price of $125, insiders set 
themselves up for exploiting their limited, positive 
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Figure 4. Plan D Proposed Purchases 
 
Finally, assume that insiders switched from plan C to 
plan B above. This switch would be consistent with material 
non-public information as well. The switch would indicate 
that insiders now worry that their material, non-public 
negative information is likely to be permanent instead of 
temporary, and they can exploit this new information by 
switching plans to sell shares instead of buying shares, if 
prices fall. 
We could easily add more examples. As all of these simple 
examples amply illustrate, it becomes easier to exploit 
material non-public information if the trading plans allow a 
limit price, formula, an algorithm, or a computer program. A 
computer program could perform a sophisticated valuation 
analysis and initiate buying and selling quantities and prices 
based on estimated undervaluation and overvaluation of an 
insider’s stock price. In contrast, a liquidity-motivated plan 
should call for the same dollar amount or the same number 
of shares to be bought or sold at regular intervals without 
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demonstrate that the SEC’s logical approach to safe harbor 
plans is misguided. 
B. Literature Review 
Insider trading within Rule 10b5-1 was first examined 
from an empirical perspective in 2009.13 In his paper on 
insiders’ strategic trades, Jagolinzer collected data from 
voluntary disclosures in SEC Form 4-K and 8-K filings and 
in business press newswire releases between October 2000 
and December 2005. The evidence suggests that trading 
within the rule still reflects informed, material non-public 
information.14 
A closely related study by Rogers finds that firms 
voluntarily disclose higher-quality financial information 
prior to insiders’ sales to limit their litigation risk.15 The 
author contrasts a sample preceding Rule 10b5-1 with a 
post-Rule 10b5-1 sample.16 Henderson et al. also report that 
insider trading litigation is costly; firms spend an average of 
$2.2 million defending against insider trading allegations.17 
Costs and penalties imposed in insider trading litigation 
have increased over time. For instance, in 2014, the total 
monetary penalties resulting from SEC enforcement actions 
was over $42 million.18 Furthermore, insiders who were 
sentenced to imprisonment were on average sentenced to 
just under twenty-four months of imprisonment.19 
 
13 See, e.g., Jagolinzer, supra note 4; Henderson et al., supra note 4. 
14 See Jagolinzer, supra note 4, at 227, 237. 
15 Jonathan L. Rogers, Disclosure Quality and Management Trading 
Incentives, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 1265, 1282–83 (2008). 
16 Id. at 1272. 
17 Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 4 n.5. 
18 See MORRISON FOERSTER LLP, INSIDER TRADING ANNUAL REVIEW 
(2014), http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/02/150211 
InsiderTradingAnnualReview.pdf [http://perma.cc/JX98-9ZLU] (hand 
collected data totaling disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil 
penalty payments from 2014 SEC insider trading enforcement actions). 
19 Id. at 17–23. 
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The increasing popularity of 10b5-1 plans makes sense 
from a litigation perspective. Henderson et al. suggest that 
the reduction in litigation risk that comes with disclosure 
under the rule creates opportunities for so-called loopholes; 
these allow insiders to trade strategically by tagging their 
more informed trades as 10b5-1 trades.20 
A recent paper by Jonathan Millian analyzes whether 
plan characteristics are consistent with routine trading, 
which is determined by examining the length of insiders’ 
sales plans.21 In this study, Millian measures the length of 
sales plans by both the number of trades executed and the 
length of a sales plan in number of calendar days. The 
author documents a significant relationship between the 
length of a plan and abnormal returns following sales under 
that plan.22 Unlike earlier studies, the evidence suggests 
that the insiders who use Rule 10b5-1 to increase the legal 
protection for their information-motivated trades are 
generally trading on short-term earnings information.23 
Other studies focus on whether insiders misrepresent 
disclosure content to optimize the payoff from their stock 
sales,24 and whether insiders who have sales plans are more 
likely to meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations in the 
immediate period preceding planned sales.25 The evidence 
 
20 See Henderson et al., supra note 4, at 20. 
21 See Jonathan A. Millian, Insider Sales Based on Short-Term 
Earnings Information: The Use of Short-Term Rule 10b5-1 Plans, REV. 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. (Dec. 2014) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276217 [http://perma. 
cc/JF4K-XTWF]. 
22 Id. at 2–3, 17–18. 
23 Id. at 17–18. 
24 See generally Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and 
Insiders’ Incentive to Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313 (2010). 
25 See John Shon & Stanley Veliotis, Insiders’ Sales Under Rule 10b5-
1 Plans and Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations, 59 MGMT. SCI. 
1988 (2013). 
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seems to suggest that insiders strategically time public 
disclosure.26 
In contrast, other studies conclude that the SEC’s safe 
harbor rule does constrain some informed insider trading.27 
For instance, studying a sample of insider sales reported to 
the SEC between January 2003 and June 2006, Rik Sen 
shows evidence of only insignificant abnormal returns 
following planned sales.28 Sen’s results suggest selection 
biases may influence the findings of these papers.29 
We extend this research in a number of significant ways. 
First, to guard against time-specific variations, our data set 
is comprehensive: we collect all reported 10b5-1 trades from 
2003 to 2013. Second, we use the calendar time portfolio 
approach to measure abnormal returns in order to guard 
against potential selection biases. Third, we test for specific 
hypotheses regarding the source of the profitability of insider 
trades. Specifically, we test whether profitability arises 
because of the possibility that insiders possess material non-
 
26 Id. at 1995–96. 
27 Rik Sen, Are Insider Sales Under 105b-1 Plans Strategically 
Timed? (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/ 
finance/docs/pdfs/Seminars/083f-sen.pdf [http://perma.cc/57ZQ-P65Z]. 
28 Id. at 1–2, 10–11, 19. 
29 Id. at 13–17. According to Rik Sen, the event studies utilizing 
methodologies that neither eliminate issues related to cross sectional 
dependence, nor control for returns on stocks with similar characteristics, 
nor take into account that the events might be endogenous when 
computing abnormal returns, may result in downward biased estimates of 
abnormal returns following planned sales. These biases tend to give both a 
lower weight to a planned sale if followed by a positive abnormal return 
and a higher weight if followed by a negative abnormal return. One way to 
mitigate these biases is to use a calendar-time portfolio approach where 
the benchmark is a matching portfolio of stocks (as of the most recent 
planned sale date) with similar characteristics. Sen also suggests that an 
equally weighted calendar-time portfolio method could help to mitigate 
these biases. Alternatively, a simple event study methodology that 
includes only the first planned sale for each firm in each calendar month 
could eliminate the mentioned biases, since including only the first 
planned sale eliminates sales by multiple insiders in the same firm around 
the same time.  
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public information at the time they set up the plans, or 
whether subsequent modifications contribute to the 
profitability of planned trades. We also investigate insider 
profitability by firm size, type of insiders, and trade volume. 
Finally, we examine the time-series evolution of 10b5-1 
trades between 2003 and 2013. 
III. DATA AND METHOD 
A. Data 
Insider trading data are obtained from the SEC and 
include a total of 1,530,792 insider transactions from all 
publicly held firms between January 2003 and December 
2013, a total of 2769 calendar days. The SEC mandated 
electronic filings of insider trading activity in May 2003.30 
Between 2000 and 2003, very few transactions were tagged 
with a 10b5-1 designation. Consequently, we exclude the 
period prior to May 2003. 
Our dataset contains transactions for an average of 
14,211 insiders in 3875 firms for each year between 2003 and 
2013. This Article focuses only on open market transactions, 
since prior research shows these to be the most informative 
transactions.31 All other transactions, such as private sales 
and purchases and exercises of options, gifts, and 
conversions, are excluded from the study. The daily stock 
returns are obtained from the files for Center for Research in 
Security Prices (“CRSP”). 
We exclude transactions with missing values and 
transactions without corresponding price and return data 
from CRSP. Additional checks on firms, prices, dates, shares, 
 
30 Mandated Electronic Filing and Website Posting for Forms 3, 4 and 
5, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,788 (May 13, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 
232, 239, 240, 249, 250, 259, 260, 269, 274). 
31 See H. NEJAT SEYHUN, INVESTMENT INTELLIGENCE FROM INSIDER 
TRADING 2, 32 (1998). 
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and 10b5-1 observations are performed.32 As a result, we 
exclude an additional 300,000 transactions containing 
apparent data errors. Our final dataset contains 1,530,792 
transactions. 
Finally, we separate insider trades between purchases 
and sales. We discuss the results separately because insider 
purchases are more likely motivated by private information, 
whereas insider sales may be driven by multiple motivations, 
e.g., diversification, information exploitation, and personal 
liquidity shocks.33 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 10b5-1 and non-
10b5-1 transactions (Panel A) and transaction value (Panel 
B) grouped by firm size. We define three firm size groups: 
small firms are defined as those with market values of less 
than $1 billion, medium firms are those with market values 
between $1 billion and $5 billion, and large firms are those 
with market values equal to or greater than $5 billion. 
Panel C shows the number of transactions and 
transaction value grouped by insider type. We identify five 
classes of insiders: members of the board of directors, 
officers, top executives, large shareholders who own more 
than 10% of any equity class in the firm, and other insiders. 
Directors are those who hold only a position on the board of 
directors, and officers are those who hold executive office. If 
a director is also an executive of the firm, then we include 
her within the top executives group as well. This 
classification allows overlap and thus our subgroups will not 
be an independent partition of the data. Others are those 
insiders who do not belong to any of the four groups 
described above. 
 
32 For instance, we also exclude all transactions where trading volume 
exceeded outstanding shares or the daily trading volume as reported by 
CRSP. We exclude all transactions where the reported stock prices 
exceeded the maximum trading price on that day as reported by CRSP. 
33 See Josef Lakonishok & Inmoo Lee, Are Insider Trades 
Informative?, 14 REV. FIN. STUD., 79, 109 (2001); A. Can Inci, Biao Lu & H. 
Nejat Seyhun, Intraday Behavior of Stock Prices and Trades around 
Insider Trading, 39 FIN. MGMT. 323, 351 (2010). 
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Finally, Panel D of Table 1 shows a time-series evolution 
of insider trading activity. We report on the number of 10b5-
1 and non-10b5-1 disclosing firms, the number of 
transactions, and the average transaction size for each year 
from 2003 to 2013. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Three size groups are defined. Small firms are those that have 
market value less than $1 billion, medium firms are those that have 
market value between $1 billion and $5 billion, and large firms are 
those that have market value equal to or greater than $5 billion.  
 
Panel A. Number of Transactions by Firm Size 
 
      Firm Size     
Transactions   Small Medium Large Total 
10b5-1 Purchases 6619 1004 153 7776 
Non-10b5-1 Purchases 266,128 49,448 13,148 328,724 
Total Purchases 272,747 50,452 13,301 336,500 
10b5-1 Sales 122,103 90,145 55,465 267,713 
Non-10b5-1 Sales 399,641 307,985 218,953 926,579 
Total Sales 521,744 398,130 274,418 1,194,292 
All transactions   794,491 448,582 287,719 1,530,792 
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Panel B. Average Transaction Value ($ million) by Firm Size 
 
    Firm Size   
Transaction value Small Medium Large 
10b5-1 Purchases 0.026 0.430 1.405 
Non-10b5-1 Purchases 0.166 0.735 1.116 
Total Purchases 0.162 0.729 1.120 
10b5-1 Sales 0.072 0.178 0.569 
Non-10b5-1 Sales 0.294 0.587 0.834 
Total Sales 0.242 0.495 0.780 
Overall average   0.214 0.521 0.796 
 
Panel C. Transactions by Insider Type 
 
      Insider type   












No tr. 310,473 368,554 212,427 290,247 73,602 1,255,303 













0.239 0.214 0.317 0.874 0.756   
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2003 3490 10,479 78,085 0.352 220 405 
2004 4370 15,556 128,609 0.349 447 969 
2005 4532 18,349 197,450 0.321 609 1474 
2006 3642 11,286 132,971 0.317 556 1091 
2007 4415 16,879 260,134 0.247 761 1860 
2008 4137 14,152 209,661 0.213 523 1067 
2009 3557 11,217 86,416 0.398 520 1053 
2010 3552 11,534 84,660 0.529 644 1351 
2011 3730 13,474 100,100 0.703 706 1509 
2012 3584 15,309 110,704 0.747 781 1834 
2013 3611 18,083 142,002 0.803 849 2539 














Av. tr. size 
2003 7749 0.131 3462 10,252 70,336 0.377 
2004 15,353 0.191 4316 14,999 113,256 0.370 
2005 41,213 0.102 4469 17,460 156,237 0.379 
2006 24,864 0.157 3545 10,583 108,107 0.354 
2007 63,826 0.102 4314 15,689 196,308 0.294 
2008 33,089 0.084 4071 13,426 176,572 0.237 
2009 10,680 0.249 3476 10,514 75,736 0.419 
2010 15,921 0.311 3454 10,690 68,739 0.579 
2011 19,294 0.281 3655 12,540 80,806 0.804 
2012 16,098 0.539 3511 14,158 94,606 0.782 
2013 27,402 0.516 3536 16,497 114,600 0.872 
Sum 275,489       1,255,303   
 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the overall sample contains 
7776 10b5-1 insider purchases and 328,724 non-planned 
insider purchases, for a total insider purchase sample size of 
336,500. Our database contains 267,713 10b5-1 insider sales 
and 926,579 non-planned insider sales, for a total insider 
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sale sample of 1,194,292. Our total sample contains 
1,530,792 insider trades. 
Looking at percentages for the overall sample, 2.3% of the 
purchases are tagged with 10b5-1 designations and 22.4% of 
the sales are tagged with 10b5-1 designations. Hence, the 
10b5-1 designation is almost ten times more likely to be used 
for sales than for purchases. Insiders appear to prefer 10b5-1 
plans mostly for their sales activity. 
Moreover, Panel A shows that insiders in smaller firms 
prefer 10b5-1 purchases over non-planned purchases (2.5%) 
at more than twice the frequency as insiders in large firms 
(1.2%). Similarly, for sales, the 10b5-1 planned to non-
planned ratio is 30.6% in small firms and 25.3% in large 
firms. Given that insider trading is more profitable in small 
firms, the fact that 10b5-1 plans are also more popular in 
small firms should be expected.34 
Panel B of Table 1 focuses on transaction size sorted by 
firm size. Both 10b5-1 purchases and sales are typically 
smaller than their non-planned counterparts. For small 
firms, 10b5-1 purchases average about $26,000, while non-
10b5-1 purchases average about $166,000. In medium size 
firms, again, 10b5-1 purchase size is smaller than non-
planned purchases. In large firms, however, the order is 
reversed, but there are only 153 such purchases. Similar 
trends are observed in sales. Planned sales tend to be 
 
34 Insiders in small firms tend to have more purchases than sales. In 
large firms, insiders have fewer purchases than sales. This evidence might 
be one reason why we observe positive abnormal returns following insider 
purchases and negative abnormal returns following insider sales. The 
strength of the small firm effect and the distribution of the sales and 
purchase transactions across firms have substantial consequences, which 
may lead to an upward bias in abnormal returns calculations. Consistent 
with this conjecture, the cumulative daily average prediction errors 
following the insider-trading day decrease substantially as firm size 
increases. This means that insiders in small firms tend to earn greater 
abnormal returns on their transactions than insiders in large firms. For 
further details on the profitability of insider trading by firm size, see H. 
Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 
16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 199–206 (1986). 
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smaller in size than non-planned sales for all three firm size 
groups. 
Looking at the types of insiders, we observe that the 
popularity of 10b5-1 plans increases proportionally with the 
amount of inside information. For top executives who are 
best informed, the frequency of 10b5-1 plans to non-10b5-1 
transactions is about 1:3. As the seniority of the insiders 
falls, so does the popularity of 10b5-1 plans. This ratio is 1:4 
for officers, 1:6 for directors, 1:6 for large shareholders, and 
1:11 for other insiders. 
While the average transaction value of 10b5-1 trades is 
smaller than that of non-planned trades across all insider 
classes, the ratio is smaller for more informed insiders.35 For 
instance, the ratio is 76.0% for top executives and 79.8% for 
officers. As one proceeds down the hierarchy, the ratio falls 
to 73.4% for directors, 20.9% for large shareholders, and 
31.0% for others. 
Finally, Panel D shows the time-series evolution of 10b5-1 
planned trades. Our analyses show that insider trading is 
becoming more prevalent over time. The evidence also points 
to increasing popularity of 10b5-1 plans over time. This is 
consistent with the findings that insider trading litigation 
costs have increased over time, and consequently the value of 
safe harbor benefits of the 10b5-1 tag have also increased 
over time. Interestingly, insider trading also appears to have 
been most prevalent during the recent financial crisis. From 
2006 to 2007, the total number of insider trades just about 
doubled, and it remained elevated throughout 2008. 
Immediately following the financial crisis, the number of 
insider transactions fell by more than 50%. 
Another observation is that the frequency of insiders who 
report 10b5-1 trades increased significantly over time. The 
data show an increase of 527% between 2003 and 2013. The 
data also show that the number of insiders who disclosed 
their transactions varies from 405 to 2539 for each year. The 
 
35 See id. at 202, 204–05 (discussing profitability of insider trading 
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also indicates that, unlike earlier studies, recent data allow 
more accurate analysis of the effects of Rule 10b5-1 on 
insider-trading and profitability.37 
B. Methodology 
To analyze and compare whether insiders’ 10b5-1 and 
non-10b5-1 purchases and sales predict future stock returns, 
we evaluate the calendar-time portfolio approach for tests of 
long-run abnormal stock returns.38 Previous research 
utilizing event studies39 suggests that this approach 
mitigates the skewness bias that arises because of the 
documented positive skewed distribution of the long-run 
abnormal returns.40 
The distribution of the calendar-time portfolio approach 
estimator is better approximated by the normal distribution 
that allows for standard statistical inference. Because the 
 
37 See, e.g., Jagolinzer, supra note 4; Henderson et al., supra note 4; 
Sen, supra note 27. 
38 For a thorough discussion of this approach, see Eugene F. Fama, 
Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. 
ECON. 283 (1998). For implementation, see, e.g., Tim Loughran & Jay R. 
Ritter, The New Issue Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23 (1995); Brad M. Barber & 
Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common 
Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261 (2001); Brad M. Barber, Reuven 
Lehavy & Brett Trueman, Comparing the Stock Recommendation 
Performance of Investment Banks and Independent Research Firms, 85 J. 
FIN. ECON. 490 (2007). For implementation in recent work, see Jagolinzer, 
supra note 4. 
39 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon, Detecting Long-Run 
Abnormal Stock Returns: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test 
Statistics, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 341 (1997); John D. Lyon, Brad M. Barber & 
Chih-Ling Tsai, Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock 
Returns, 54 J. FIN. 165 (1999); S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, 
Measuring Long-Horizon Security Price Performance, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 301 
(1997); Mark J. Mitchell & Erik Stafford, Managerial Decisions and Long-
Term Stock Price Performance, 73 J. BUS. 287 (2000). 
40 The positive skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics 
causing smaller p values for lower-tailed tests (thus an inflated 
significance level), and larger p values for upper-tailed tests (thus a loss of 
power). See Seyhun, supra note 34. 
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firm returns are clustered into a single portfolio, using a 
calendar-time portfolio approach also eliminates the problem 
of cross-sectional dependence among the event-firm 
abnormal returns in the portfolio variance. 
For each holding period, we obtain daily calendar-time 
portfolio returns for 2769 insider trade days between the 
years of 2003 and 2013. We compute calendar-time portfolios 
based on insider-trading and holding periods of one, three, 
six, and twelve months following the insider trade. In Tables 
2 and 3, we form four portfolios, one each for 10b5-1 and non-
10b5-1 purchases and one each for 10b5-1 and non-10b5-1 
sales. In the remaining tables, we form separate portfolios 
for each insider trade pattern, insider position within the 
firm, and firm characteristics within Rule10b5-1 and non-
10b5-1. We do this for purchases and sales separately. 
During each holding period, if more than one insider traded 
a particular stock, or if the same insider traded a stock 
multiple times, then that stock will appear multiple times in 
the portfolio. The calendar-time portfolio return on event 
date t is given by Equation 1: 
ሺ1ሻ												ܴ௣௧ ൌ ଵ௡೟ ∑ ܴ௜௧
௡೟௜ୀଵ      
where ܴ௜௧ is the gross return (with dividends) on event date t 
for trade ݅, which is either a purchase or a sale, and ݊௧ is the 
number of purchases or sales in the portfolio corresponding 
to holding periods of one, three, six, and twelve months, 
respectively. This calculation yields a time series of daily 
returns for each portfolio, ܴ௣௧. 
We compute excess returns by subtracting the risk-free 
rate from each portfolio’s gross return. We then estimate 
abnormal returns by regressing these daily portfolio excess 
returns on the daily excess return to the equally-weighted 
index of New York Stock Exchange, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
stocks and other risk factors.41 We follow the standard 
 
41 Although not reported here, using the total return as the 
benchmark for the value-weighted market portfolio instead of the total 
return to the equally-weighted market portfolio gives similar results. 
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literature42 and use Fama-French and Carhart factors to 
control for expected returns in the regressions.43 In these 
regressions, abnormal return is calculated as the intercept 
ߙ௣, from the four-factor model, in the following time series 
regression for each portfolio ݌. All daily returns are 
expressed in basis points. 
  
ሺ2ሻ									ܴ௣௧ െ ௙ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ௣ ൅ ܾ௣൫ܴ௠௧ െ ௙ܴ௧൯ ൅ ݏ௣ሺܵܯܤ௧ሻ ൅
݄௣ሺܪܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݑ௣ሺܷܯܦ௧ሻ ൅ ݁௣௧                  
 
ܴ௣௧ is the simple daily return on the calendar-time 
portfolio formed for each trade group, ௙ܴ௧ is the daily return 
on three-month U.S. Treasury bills, ܴ௠௧ is the return on an 
equally-weighted market index, ܵܯܤ௧ is the difference in the 
returns of value-weighted portfolios of small stocks and large 
stocks, ܪܯܮ௧ is the difference in the returns of value-
weighted portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low 
 
42 It has been noted however, that common estimation procedures 
such as cumulative abnormal return and buy-and-hold returns produce 
biased test statistics. In addition, these methodologies ignore cross-
sectional dependence of event-firm abnormal returns that are overlapping 
in calendar time (which is a very common feature of our data, as multiple 
executives across different firms trade during similar time windows) and 
are likely to produce biased test statistics. Therefore, Lyon, Barber and 
Tsai, Fama, and Mitchell and Stafford advocate a calendar-time portfolio 
approach for measuring long-term abnormal performance. By forming 
daily calendar-time portfolios, all cross-correlations of event-firm 
abnormal returns are automatically accounted for in the portfolio 
variance. The distribution of this estimator is better approximated by the 
normal distribution, allowing for classical statistical inference. See Barber 
& Lyon, supra note 39; Fama, supra note 38; Kothari & Warner, supra 
note 39; Lyon, Barber & Tsai, supra note 39; Mitchell & Stafford, supra 
note 39.  
43 These factors include market factor, book-to-market factor, size and 
momentum. Kenneth R. French, Current Research Returns, KENNETH R. 
FRENCH, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_lib 
rary.html [http://perma.cc/4LFM-64J5]. For implementation, see, e.g., 
Barber & Lyon, supra note 39; Fama, supra note 38; Mark Carhart, On 
Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997). 
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book-to-market stocks, and ܷܯܦ௧ is the difference in returns 
of a value-weighted portfolio of stocks with high and low 
recent (six months) returns. ݁௣௧ is an independent and 
identically distributed error term. The estimate of the 
intercept ߙ௣ provides a test of the null hypothesis that the 
mean daily abnormal return on the calendar-time portfolio is 
zero. 
We also estimate stacked regressions to provide 
coefficient difference test statistics across the 10b5-1 and the 
non-10b5-1 samples. One advantage that our comparison 
provides is that analyzing non-Rule 10b5-1 participant trade 
returns during the same holding period works as a control 
group and allows us to control for firm-, industry-, and 
macro-level factors that may otherwise affect insiders’ 10b5-
1 trade returns. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Abnormal Returns and Rule 10b5-1 
Table 2 presents the average daily abnormal returns to 
the portfolios of 10b5-1 and non-10b5-1 trades separately for 
the holding periods of one, three, six, and twelve months. To 
obtain expected returns, we use the simple CAPM. Table 2 
also shows the differences between 10b5-1 planned and non-
planned trades, and their test statistics from stacked 
regressions. 
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Table 2. Results from CAPM Returns on 10b5-1 
and Non-10b5-1 Trades 
ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߝ௧, where ܴ௣,௧ is calendar-time 
portfolios based on insider trading and holding period, ܴ௠,௧ is the 
return on the CRSP equally-weighted index for day ݐ. ௙ܴ,௧ is the 
daily risk-free interest rate (one-day treasury bill rate). The 
coefficients are obtained from an OLS regression on the estimation 
period returns. Stacked regressions are run to provide coefficient 
difference test statistics across 10b5-1 participant and 
nonparticipant samples. Results are shown for the horizon of the 
following one, three, six months, and one year. 
 
    
10b5-1 
   (1) 
  Non-10b5-1 
  (2) 
 Diff. 
(1)-(2) 
Purchasesa Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
CAPM 1 month 0.0012 2.72 0.0013 10.11 -0.0001 -0.28 
CAPM 3 months 0.0005 1.33 0.0004 4.73 0.0001 0.24 
CAPM 6 months 0.0004 1.16 0.0002 2.58 0.0002 0.60 
CAPM 1 year 0.0004 1.30 0.0001 0.98 0.00035 1.02 
Salesb Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
CAPM 1 month -0.0006 -3.12 -0.0004 -3.65 -0.0001 -0.67 
CAPM 3 months -0.0005 -2.81 -0.0003 -3.81 -0.0002 -0.90 
CAPM 6 months -0.0004 -2.37 -0.0003 -4.38 -0.0001 -0.42 
CAPM 1 year -0.0003 -2.03 -0.0003 -4.35 0.0000 -0.19 
a and b The number of observations used in both purchases and sales 
regressions is 2769.  
 
Our evidence in Table 2 shows that on average, insider 
purchases in non-10b5-1 plans outperform the market 
significantly for holding periods of one, three, and six 
months. The average daily abnormal returns are 0.13% (t-
statistics: 10.11), 0.04% (t-statistics: 4.73), and 0.02% (t-
statistics: 2.58) for corresponding holding periods. These 
abnormal returns are also economically significant. 
Cumulative abnormal return (“CAR”) after one year 
following insider trades adds up to 10% (obtained as the sum 
of the abnormal returns from one day after insider trading 
day to corresponding 20, 60, 125, and 250 days after the 
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insider trading day). These findings are consistent with the 
prior literature’s assessment that insiders’ purchases convey 
material non-public information.44 
Table 2 further shows that insiders’ 10b5-1 planned 
purchases also out-perform the market for a one-month 
holding period, with an average daily abnormal return of 
0.12% (t-statistics: 2.72). For other holding periods, abnormal 
returns following 10b5-1 purchases are insignificant. 
However, a statistical difference between the abnormal 
returns of 10b5-1 and non-10b5-1 purchases does not seem to 
exist. Hence, insiders’ purchases within 10b5-1 plans appear 
to be just as profitable as non-planned purchases. This 
evidence is inconsistent with the presumption of safe harbor 
for insider purchases. Caution is required here because the 
sample size for 10b5-1 planned purchases is relatively small. 
Consequently, any definitive statements regarding the 
statistical significance of insiders’ 10b5-1 planned purchases 
must be tempered in light of the small sample size. 
The results are similar for insiders’ sales. Our evidence 
shows that both insiders’ 10b5-1 and non-10b5-1 sales under-
perform the market significantly, indicating that insiders’ 
sales are motivated by negative material non-public 
information. Consistent with prior literature, profitability of 
insiders’ sales appears to be lower than insiders’ purchases. 
After one year, CARs are equal to -7.5% for participant and 
nonparticipant sales. Interestingly, once again, there is no 
difference in profitability between the participant and the 
nonparticipant samples. Insiders’ sales under 10b5-1 
planned trades are again just as profitable as the non-
planned sales. Again, this evidence is inconsistent with the 
safe harbor for insiders’ sales, since there is no evidence that 
insiders are using 10b5-1 plans to only report diversification-
related sales transactions. 
 
 







































































 it easier t
ding month








































































































































































MAVRUK & SEYHUN – FINAL  
No. 1:133] SEC’S 10B5-1 SAFE HARBOR RULES 163 
For sales, the declines in prices for the first month after 
the trading day for 10b5-1 planned sales and non-planned 
sales appear to be very similar. After one month, the two 
patterns diverge and 10b5-1 planned sales show somewhat 
greater abnormal profitability. Over a full year, stock prices 
fall sharply following both 10b5-1 and non-10b5-1 sales, with 
10b5-1 planned sales showing greater declines. Nevertheless, 
the differences in cumulative abnormal returns between 
10b5-1 planned and non-planned sales do not attain 
statistical significance. 
The shapes of abnormal returns for both planned and 
non-planned purchases and sales indicate that insiders 
exploit short-lived information. Cumulative abnormal 
returns for purchases tend to increase at a relatively sharper 
rate for the first six months and then tend to level off. 
Similarly, in the case of cumulative abnormal returns for 
sales, stock prices fall at a relatively sharper rate for about 
six months and then tend to level off. 
Table 3. Results from Fama-French Carhart Four-
Factor Model Returns  
ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߚଶܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚସܷܯܦ௧ ൅
ߝ௧, where ܴ௣,௧ is calendar-time portfolios based on insider trading 
and holding period, ܴ௠,௧ is the return on the CRSP equally-
weighted index for day ݐ.  
௙ܴ,௧ is the daily risk-free interest rate (one-day treasury bill 
rate). ܵܯܤ௧ (small minus big) is a mimicking portfolio to capture 
risk related to size, ܪܯܮ௧ (high minus low) is a mimicking portfolio 
to capture risk associated with book-to-market characteristics, and 
ܷܯܦ௧ (up minus down) is a mimicking portfolio designed to address 
risk associated with prior returns by subtracting a portfolio of low 
prior return firms from a portfolio of high prior return firms. ߙ is 
the abnormal return. The coefficients are obtained from an OLS 
regression on the estimation period returns. Stacked regressions 
are run to provide coefficient difference test statistics across 10b5-1 
participant and nonparticipant samples. Results are shown for the 
horizon of the following one month, three months, six months, and 
one year.   
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Purchasesa Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
4-factor AR 1 month 0.0012 2.36 0.0013 10.25 -0.0002 -0.36 
4-factor AR 3 months 0.0005 0.90 0.0005 5.31 0.0001 0.15 
4-factor AR 6 months 0.0004 0.71 0.0002 2.83 0.0002 0.47 
4-factor AR 1 year 0.0004 1.04 0.0001 0.96 0.0003 0.94 
Salesb Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
4-factor AR 1 month -0.0006 -2.81 -0.0005 -3.48 -0.0001 -0.70 
4-factor AR 3 months -0.0005 -3.25 -0.0004 -3.49 -0.0002 -0.95 
4-factor AR 6 months -0.0004 -2.79 -0.0003 -4.03 -0.0001 -0.49 
4-factor AR 1 year -0.0003 -2.34 -0.0003 -3.62 0.0000 -0.25 
a and b The number of observations used in both purchases and sales 
regressions is 2769.  
 
In Table 3, we repeat our analyses by including firm size, 
book-to-market characteristics, and momentum factor 
returns.45 For our expected return model, we use the four-
factor Fama-French model, with a calendar-time portfolio 
approach. We obtain very similar results to those shown in 
Table 2. The magnitude of abnormal returns differs only 
slightly from the simple CAPM model. These findings 
indicate that our results are not sensitive to variations in 
measuring expected returns. 
So far our evidence suggests that insiders exploit their 
material non-public information using both 10b5-1 planned 
and non-planned transactions since positive abnormal 
returns follow their purchases and negative abnormal 
returns follow their sales. Overall, there is no evidence that 
10b5-1 plan transactions deserve any safe harbor treatment. 
   
 
45 See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors 
in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993); Carhart, 
supra note 43. 
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B. Abnormal Returns, Rule 10b5-1, and Insider 
Trading Patterns 
In our next analyses we seek to understand the reasons 
behind the profitability of 10b5-1 planned trades. As we 
discussed earlier, there are two non-competing explanations 
for the profitability of 10b5-1 planned trades. First, insiders 
may set up these plans while in possession of material non-
public information. We test this hypothesis by comparing the 
profitability of the first trade from the plan with subsequent 
trades. If the first trade is profitable, this finding would 
corroborate the hypothesis that insiders set up these plans in 
possession of material non-public information, thus in 
violation of the requirements of the 10b5-1 plans. 
Second, 10b5-1 plans typically call for regular trading 
schedules at regular intervals.46 In many examples, insiders 
sell exactly the same number of shares at about the same 
time every month.47 We hypothesize that if insiders receive 
subsequent information that is at odds with their planned 
trades, they may respond by cancelling or modifying the 
terms of the existing plans. These actions will then tend to 
introduce breaks in insider trading patterns and result in 
irregular trading patterns. We test this hypothesis by 
examining the relationship between the profitability and 
regularity of the planned trades. If there is no difference in 
profitability of regular and irregular trades, then this finding 
would suggest that profitability comes from the information 
possessed at the time the plan is set up. However, if 
irregular trades are more profitable than regular trades, this 
finding would suggest that insiders intervene in the 
scheduled trades to take advantage of any subsequent non-
public information they come to possess by changing the 
magnitude or timing of their planned trades, by cancelling 
their plans altogether, or by otherwise modifying their plans. 
 
 
46 See Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 5; Sasseen, supra note 7. 
47 See Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 5. 
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Table 4. Results from Fama-French Carhart Four-
Factor Model Returns by Trade Patterns 
ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߚଶܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷܪܯܮ௧ ൅ߚସܷܯܦ௧ ൅ ߝ௧, where ܴ௣,௧ is calendar-time portfolios based on 
insider trading and holding period, ܴ௠,௧ is the return on the CRSP 
equally-weighted index for day ݐ.  
௙ܴ,௧ is the daily risk-free interest rate (one-day treasury bill 
rate). ܵܯܤ௧ (small minus big) is a mimicking portfolio to capture 
risk related to size, ܪܯܮ௧ (high minus low) is a mimicking portfolio 
to capture risk associated with book-to-market characteristics, and 
ܷܯܦ௧ (up minus down) is a mimicking portfolio designed to address 
risk associated with prior returns by subtracting a portfolio of low 
prior return firms from a portfolio of high prior return firms. ߙ is 
the abnormal return. The coefficients are obtained from an OLS 
regression on the estimation period returns. Stacked regressions 
are run to provide coefficient difference test statistics across 10b5-1 
participant and nonparticipant samples. Results are shown for the 
horizon of the following: one month, three months, six months, and 
one year. In Panel A, initial insider trade is determined as if the 
insider is making a transaction for the first time in the sample. 
Subsequent insider trades are the trades following the initial 
trade. Calendar-time portfolios are formed for the initial insider 
trade and subsequent insider trades separately.  
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Purchasesa Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Initial insider 
trade 1 month 0.0011 1.89 0.0015 14.78 -0.0004 -0.64 
Initial insider 
trade 3 months 0.0004 0.95 0.0006 8.85 -0.0001 -0.32 
Initial insider 
trade 6 months 0.0003 0.85 0.0003 5.93 0.0000 -0.05 
Initial insider 
trade 1 year 0.0004 1.26 0.0002 3.79 0.0002 0.66 
Subsequent 
insider trades 1 month 0.0010 2.53 0.0013 9.30 -0.0003 -0.79 
Subsequent 
insider trades 3 months 0.0003 0.96 0.0005 4.53 -0.0001 -0.32 
Subsequent 
insider trades 6 months 0.0002 0.62 0.0002 2.61 0.0000 -0.08 
Subsequent 
insider trades 1 year 0.0002 0.81 0.0001 1.22 0.0001 0.37 
Salesb Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Initial insider 
trade 1 month -0.0005 -2.99 -0.0005 -6.41 0.0001 0.42 
Initial insider 
trade 3 months -0.0005 -3.32 -0.0004 -5.98 -0.0001 -0.74 
Initial insider 
trade 6 months -0.0004 -3.28 -0.0004 -6.87 -0.0001 -0.53 
Initial insider 
trade 1 year -0.0004 -2.97 -0.0003 -5.86 -0.0001 -0.75 
Subsequent 
insider trades 1 month -0.0005 -3.05 -0.0005 -3.72 -0.0001 -0.26 
Subsequent 
insider trades 3 months -0.0005 -3.45 -0.0004 -4.01 -0.0001 -0.73 
Subsequent 
insider trades 6 months -0.0004 -3.03 -0.0003 -4.40 0.0000 -0.17 
Subsequent 
insider trades 1 year -0.0003 -2.57 -0.0003 -4.13 0.0000 0.15 
a and b The number of observations used in both purchases and sales 
regressions is 2769.  
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The results are shown in Table 4, Panels A and B. In 
Panel A, for initial 10b5-1 insider purchases, the abnormal 
return is eleven basis points per day (about 2.2% per month). 
This abnormal return does not attain statistical significance 
given the small sample size. For non-planned purchases, the 
abnormal returns are fifteen basis points per day (about 3% 
per month). This value is highly significant. The differences 
between planned and non-planned purchases are 
insignificant. For subsequent purchases, both planned and 
non-planned purchases (after one month) exhibit statistically 
significant profitability, and once again, the differences do 
not attain statistical significance. 
Similar patterns can be seen in the case of insiders’ sales. 
Both initial sales and subsequent sales show abnormal 
profitability for both planned and non-planned sales, while 
the differences again do not attain statistical significance. 
Initial insider sales under 10b5-1 plans show an abnormal 
profit of about five basis points per day during the first 
month (about -1% per month). This value is highly 
significant. For the initial non-planned insider sales, 
abnormal profitability also attains five basis points per day 
during the first month (-1% per month). This value is also 
highly significant. Again, the differences between these 
values are not statistically significant. The subsequent sale 
trades are profitable for both planned and non-planned sales. 
Once again, the differences are not statistically significant. 
Our key finding so far is that the very first trade from a 
10b5-1 plan shows abnormal profitability. This finding 
corroborates our conclusion that 10b5-1 plans are actually 
set up when insiders possess material non-public 
information. Such behavior would violate the safe harbor 
requirements of Rule 10b5-1. 
In Panel B of Table 4 we examine whether regularity of 
trades under Rule 10b5-1 is related to the trade’s 
profitability. We classify insider trades into four categories: 
(i) a “regular trade” is defined as another 10b5-1 transaction 
coming from the same insider made in the past twenty to 
twenty-five trading days with the same number of shares; (ii) 
a “regular interval-irregular amount” trade is defined as 
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another 10b5-1 transaction coming from the same insider 
made in the past twenty to twenty-five trading days, but the 
number of shares traded is different; (iii) an “irregular 
interval-regular amount trade” is defined as another 10b5-1 
transaction coming from the same insider with the same 
number of shares made anytime in the past three months; 
and finally, (iv) an “irregular trade” is defined as a 10b5-1 
transaction in none of the above mentioned three groups. We 
present our result only for trades within Rule 10b5-1. As a 
caveat, it is important to repeat that our sample size for 
purchases is small. 
 
Panel B. Trade Interval within Rule 10b5-1 
 
An irregular trade is a 10b5-1 transaction not in one of the 
following three groups. A regular interval-irregular amount trade 
is defined as another 10b5-1 transaction coming from the same 
insider made in the past 20–25 trading days, but with a different 
number of shares traded. An irregular interval-regular amount 
trade is another 10b5-1 transaction coming from the same insider 
with the same number of shares made anytime in the past three 
months. A regular trade is another 10b5-1 transaction coming from 
the same insider made in the past 20–25 trading days with the 
same number of shares. Results are shown for the horizon of the 
following one month, three months, six months, and one year. 
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10b5-1  .  Purchasesa Salesb 
Transaction interval Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Irregular trade 1 month 0.0015 3.46 -0.0006 -3.46 
Irregular trade 3 months 0.0008 2.21 -0.0005 -3.21 
Irregular trade 6 months 0.0006 1.62 -0.0004 -2.60 
Irregular trade 1 year 0.0004 1.42 -0.0003 -2.31 
Regular interval, 
irregular amount  
1 month 0.0002 0.39 -0.0010 -3.01 
Regular interval, 
irregular amount  
3 months -0.0004 -0.76 -0.0006 -2.41 
Regular interval, 
irregular amount  
6 months -0.0003 -0.59 -0.0005 -2.43 
Regular interval, 
irregular amount  
1 year -0.0002 -0.56 -0.0004 -2.06 
Irregular interval, 
regular amount  
1 month 0.0005 0.97 -0.0005 -2.16 
Irregular interval, 
regular amount  
3 months 0.0006 1.22 -0.0003 -1.63 
Irregular interval, 
regular amount  
6 months 0.0002 0.51 -0.0002 -1.44 
Irregular interval, 
regular amount  
1 year 0.0005 1.39 -0.0002 -1.35 
Regular trade 1 month 0.0002 0.51 -0.0006 -2.03 
Regular trade 3 months -0.0001 -0.26 -0.0001 -0.13 
Regular trade 6 months -0.0002 -0.35 -0.0004 -1.44 
Regular trade 1 year -0.00001 -0.03 -0.0003 -1.43 
a and b The number of observations used in both purchases and sales 
regressions is 2769. 
 
Our overall conclusion from Panel B is that irregular 
trades tend to be more profitable. When insider trades are 
regular, the only group with abnormal profitability is sales 
after one month. However, irregular sales groups show 
profitability after all the analyzed periods. Furthermore, 
additional irregularities increase profitability. When both 
trade amount and trade interval are irregular, both 
purchases and sales show statistically significant abnormal 
profitability. These results indicate that Rule 10b5-1 
purchases are followed by significantly positive abnormal 
MAVRUK & SEYHUN – FINAL  
No. 1:133] SEC’S 10B5-1 SAFE HARBOR RULES 171 
returns for holding periods of one and three months only in 
the irregular trade sample. Average daily abnormal returns 
are 0.15% (t-statistics: 3.46) and 0.08% (t-statistics: 2.21), 
respectively. Thus insiders’ irregular 10b5-1 purchases show 
enhanced profitability. 
Irregular sales within Rule 10b5-1 convey the most 
meaningful signal to outsiders. Abnormal returns in this 
sample are significantly negative for all holding periods, 
accumulating CAR of about -7.5% one year after insider 
sales. 
Additional evidence shown in Table 4 Panel B indicates 
that adding regularity to either trading volume or trading 
interval reduces the profitability of insider trades under 
10b5-1 plans. Overall, our finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that insiders intervene in their planned 
transactions to increase profitability. Furthermore, the 
greater the intervention (in terms of both trading volumes 
and trading intervals), the greater the increase in 
profitability. 
C. Abnormal Returns, Rule 10b5-1, and Insiders’ 
Trade Volume 
In our next set of analyses, we seek to further understand 
the reasons behind the profitability of 10b5-1 planned trades. 
We examine whether the same factors that lead to profitable 
insiders’ transactions in general are at work for 10b5-1 
planned trades. For this purpose, we test to see if the 
abnormal returns earned by insiders are systematically 
related to the size of their transactions, the size of their 
firms, and the insiders’ positions within the firm. We 
measure expected stock returns using the same four-factor 
model as shown in Table 3.48 
In Panel A of Table 5, we analyze whether higher trading 
volumes show increased profitability for 10b5-1 planned 
trades. For this purpose, we group insider trading into three 
 
48 See Fama & French, supra note 45. 
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trade volume groups. Group 1 is defined as trades of fewer 
than 1000 shares. Group 2 is defined as trades of between 
1000 and 10,000 shares. Finally, Group 3 includes trades of 
greater than 10,000 shares. 
Table 5. Results from Fama-French & Carhart 
Four-Factor Model Returns by Trade Volume, 
Type of Insider, and Firm Size 
Panel A. Abnormal Returns, Rule 10b5-1, and Insiders’ Trade 
Volume 
Trade volume Group 1 is defined as transactions of fewer than 
1000 shares. Group 2 is defined as transactions of between 1000 
and 10,000 shares and group 3 includes transactions of more than 
10,000 shares. Results are shown for the horizon of the following: 
one month, three months, six months, and one year. 
 







Trade volume Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Less than 1000 1 month 0.0009 2.00 0.0009 5.74 0.0000 -0.06 
Less than 1000 3 months 0.0004 0.92 0.0003 3.10 0.0000 0.10 
Less than 1000 6 months 0.0003 0.71 0.0002 1.80 0.0001 0.28 
Less than 1000 1 year 0.0002 0.57 0.0001 0.79 0.0001 0.30 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
1 month 0.0010 2.35 0.0014 9.84 -0.0004 -0.94 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
3 months 0.0000 -0.12 0.0005 5.62 -0.0006 -1.36 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
6 months -0.0003 -0.87 0.0002 3.07 -0.0006 -1.47 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
1 year -0.0001 -0.24 0.0001 1.20 -0.0002 -0.56 
Greater than 
10,000 
1 month 0.0007 1.38 0.0022 9.95 -0.0015 -2.52 
Greater than 
10,000 
3 months 0.0009 1.44 0.0006 3.24 0.0003 0.43 
Greater than 
10,000 
6 months 0.0006 0.88 0.0003 1.63 0.0003 0.44 
Greater than 
10,000 
1 year 0.0011 1.84 0.0001 0.53 0.0010 1.66 
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Trade volume Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Less than 1000 1 month -0.0006 -2.72 -0.0006 -4.53 -0.00006 -0.22 
Less than 1000 3 months -0.0006 -2.80 -0.0004 -4.64 -0.0001 -0.62 
Less than 1000 6 months -0.0004 -2.31 -0.0004 -4.35 0.0000 -0.19 
Less than 1000 1 year -0.0002 -1.73 -0.0003 -4.01 0.0000 0.30 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
1 month -0.0004 -3.05 -0.0004 -3.42 0.0000 0.03 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
3 months -0.0005 -4.04 -0.0003 -4.17 -0.0001 -0.89 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
6 months -0.0004 -3.75 -0.0003 -4.31 -0.0001 -0.81 
Between 1000 
and 10,000 
1 year -0.0003 -3.38 -0.0003 -4.20 -0.0001 -0.59 
Greater than 
10,000 






3 months -0.0004 -2.19 -0.0003 -1.54 -0.0001 -0.34 
Greater than 
10,000 
6 months -0.0003 -1.95 -0.0004 -2.95 0.0001 0.40 
Greater than 
10,000 
1 year -0.0003 -2.20 -0.0003 -3.02 0.00002 0.12 
a and b The number of observations used in both purchases and sales 
regressions is 2769.  
 
While insiders’ purchases under non-10b5-1 plans show a 
strong relation between profitability and trading volume, the 
same relation does not hold for 10b5-1 planned purchases. 
The most profitable group here is Group 2 (trading volume 
between 1000 and 10,000 shares), while the least profitable 
one is Group 3 (10,000 or greater volume of purchases). This 
finding suggests that the information-based motivation for 
purchases tends to be somewhat weaker for planned 10b5-1 
purchases. 
For insider sales, long-term profitability of more than one 
year is much stronger for both planned and non-planned 
sales in Group 2 (between 1000 and 10,000 sales volume) 
and in Group 3 (10,000 or greater sales volume) than in 
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Group 1 (volume of fewer than 1000 shares). This finding is 
consistent with the conclusion that both 10b5-1 and non-
10b5-1 sales are motivated by the quality of information. 
When insiders have more valuable information, they 
increase the volume of trading for both 10b5-1 and non-10b5-
1 sales.49 
D. Abnormal Returns, Rule 10b5-1, and Firm Size 
Panel B of Table 5 shows analyses examining whether 
Rule 10b5-1 influences the identification of unusual insider-
trading activity by partitioning the sample into the firm size 
classes defined earlier. Typically, insiders in small firms, as 
opposed to insiders in large firms, tend to have a better 
picture of their firm’s entire organization and tend to 
forecast the stock returns of their firms to a better extent. 
Previous evidence suggests that in large firms, any given 
piece of information is less likely to have a substantial 
impact on the stock prices, and hence, insiders in large firms 




49 While not shown here, extremely high sales volumes (over 100,000 
shares) are associated with lower abnormal returns for both planned and 
non-planned sales. This finding indicates that insiders do worry about 
trading extremely large volumes before important information events for 
fear of attracting litigation. 
50 See SEYHUN, supra note 31, at 89–92. 
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Panel B. Abnormal Returns, Rule 10b5-1, and Firm Size 
 
Three size groups are defined. Small firms are those that have 
market values less than $1 billion, medium firms are those that 
have market values between $1 billion and $5 billion, and large 
firms are those that have market values equal to or greater than 
$5 billion.  
 







Firm size Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Less than $1B 1 month 0.0015 2.91 0.0015 10.66 0.0000 -0.06 
Less than $1B 3 months 0.0008 1.74 0.0006 6.01 0.0002 0.41 
Less than $1B 6 months 0.0006 1.45 0.0004 4.71 0.0002 0.51 
Less than $1B 1 year 0.0005 1.47 0.0002 2.79 0.0003 0.85 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
1 month 0.0000 0.07 0.0001 0.61 -0.0001 -0.22 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
3 months 0.0002 0.66 -0.0003 -2.14 0.0005 1.45 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
6 months -0.0003 -0.81 -0.0004 -3.43 0.0001 0.25 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
1 year -0.0002 -0.57 -0.0004 -1.97 0.0002 0.42 
Greater than 
$5B 
1 month -0.0004 -1.42 0.0001 0.42 -0.0005 -1.42 
Greater than 
$5B 
3 months -0.0003 -0.97 -0.0001 -0.40 -0.0002 -0.71 
Greater than 
$5B 
6 months -0.0003 -1.05 -0.0003 -2.04 0.0000 -0.13 
Greater than 
$5B 
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Firm size  Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Less than $1B 1 month -0.0006 -2.58 -0.0005 -2.40 -0.0001 -0.48 
Less than $1B 3 months -0.0006 -2.76 -0.0003 -2.70 -0.0003 -1.04 
Less than $1B 6 months -0.0004 -2.15 -0.0004 -4.04 -0.0001 -0.29 
Less than $1B 1 year -0.0003 -1.58 -0.0003 -3.61 0.0000 -0.13 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
1 month -0.0007 -4.19 -0.0005 -4.81 -0.0002 -0.91 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
3 months -0.0006 -4.50 -0.0004 -4.66 -0.0002 -1.15 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
6 months -0.0005 -3.99 -0.0004 -4.19 -0.0002 -1.07 
Between $1B 
and $5B 
1 year -0.0004 -3.41 -0.0003 -3.89 -0.0001 -0.75 
Greater than 
$5B 
1 month -0.0003 -1.73 -0.0005 -4.16 0.0002 0.89 
Greater than 
$5B 
3 months -0.0003 -2.03 -0.0004 -3.87 0.0001 0.45 
Greater than 
$5B 
6 months -0.0003 -1.92 -0.0003 -3.79 0.0001 0.47 
Greater than 
$5B 
1 year -0.0003 -2.31 -0.0003 -4.00 0.0001 0.36 
a and b The number of observations used in both purchases and sales 
regressions is 2769. 
 
Our results in Panel B indicate that insider purchases are 
most profitable in smaller firms. This finding holds for both 
10b5-1 planned and non-planned trades. Moreover, the 
magnitudes of profitability for planned and non-planned 
trades are similar. The differences in abnormal profits do not 
attain statistical significance. 
Firm size appears to be less of a factor in the profitability 
of insider sales. This finding is true for both planned and 
non-planned sales. The biggest profitability occurs in 
medium sized firms. This finding is consistent with the 
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finance literature that suggests insider sales exhibit lesser 
profitability than insider purchases.51 
E. Abnormal Returns, Rule 10b5-1, and Insiders’ 
Positions within the Firm 
In Panel C of Table 5 we examine how profitability of 
insider trading correlates with types of insiders. The typical 
relations documented in the finance literature also hold 
here.52 Typically, the profitability of insider trading is 
greatest for high ranking officers, followed by directors, 
officers, and large shareholders.53 
 
Panel C. Abnormal Returns, Rule 10b5-1, and Insiders’ 
Positions Within the Firm 
 







Insider type Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Director 1 month 0.0007 1.62 0.0012 11.03 -0.0005 -1.00 
Director 3 months 0.0007 1.75 0.0005 6.58 0.0002 0.47 
Director 6 months 0.0006 1.59 0.0002 3.56 0.0004 0.98 
Director 1 year 0.0004 1.12 0.0001 1.98 0.0003 0.82 
Officer 1 month 0.0011 1.84 0.0012 8.43 -0.0001 -0.21 
Officer 3 months 0.0011 2.08 0.0005 5.42 0.0006 1.11 
Officer 6 months 0.0008 1.65 0.0003 3.63 0.0006 1.07 
Officer 1 year 0.0005 1.13 0.0002 2.32 0.0003 0.76 
Top Executive 1 month 0.0008 1.55 0.0019 5.94 -0.0010 -1.62 
Top Executive 3 months 0.0003 0.64 0.0009 3.79 -0.0005 -0.89 
Top Executive 6 months 0.0001 0.22 0.0005 3.36 -0.0003 -0.68 
Top Executive 1 year 0.0001 0.12 0.0002 2.16 -0.0002 -0.33 
 
51 See id. at 43–46, 86–88; Lakonishok & Lee, supra note 33, at 79–
111. 
52 See SEYHUN, supra note 31, at 68–74. 
53 Id. at 72–74. 
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10% owner 1 month 0.0006 1.27 0.0015 5.66 -0.0009 -1.55 
10% owner 3 months -0.0001 -0.17 0.0004 2.26 -0.0005 -0.95 
10% owner 6 months 0.0002 0.35 0.0002 1.29 0.0000 -0.07 
10% owner 1 year 0.0010 2.16 0.0001 0.47 0.0009 1.82 
Other 1 month -0.0001 -0.20 0.0006 2.12 -0.0007 -1.69 
Other 3 months 0.0002 0.60 0.0000 0.12 0.0002 0.39 
Other 6 months -0.0002 -0.46 0.0003 0.96 -0.0005 -0.88 
Other 1 year -0.0003 -0.75 0.0002 0.80 -0.0006 -1.05 
Salesb               
Insider type Horizon Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
Director 1 month -0.0008 -3.29 -0.0006 -3.31 -0.0002 -0.62 
Director 3 months -0.0009 -3.68 -0.0005 -3.57 -0.0003 -1.23 
Director 6 months -0.0007 -2.49 -0.0005 -3.54 -0.0002 -0.60 
Director 1 year -0.0005 -1.96 -0.0004 -3.25 -0.0001 -0.19 
Officer 1 month -0.0004 -2.32 -0.0004 -3.80 -0.0001 -0.24 
Officer 3 months -0.0004 -2.41 -0.0004 -5.27 0.0000 0.03 
Officer 6 months -0.0002 -1.63 -0.0004 -5.10 0.0001 0.84 
Officer 1 year -0.0001 -1.17 -0.0003 -4.16 0.0001 1.03 
Top Executive 1 month -0.0006 -2.94 -0.0005 -2.93 -0.0001 -0.23 
Top Executive 3 months -0.0005 -2.90 -0.0004 -3.15 -0.0001 -0.63 
Top Executive 6 months -0.0004 -3.03 -0.0004 -3.57 -0.0001 -0.39 
Top Executive 1 year -0.0004 -3.04 -0.0003 -3.22 -0.0001 -0.38 
10% owner 1 month -0.0001 -0.20 -0.0004 -1.32 0.0003 0.67 
10% owner 3 months -0.0001 -0.31 -0.0001 -0.60 0.0000 0.14 
10% owner 6 months -0.0002 -0.68 -0.0002 -1.46 0.0000 0.14 
10% owner 1 year -0.0002 -0.81 -0.0003 -2.24 0.0001 0.33 
Other 1 month -0.0003 -0.65 -0.0003 -0.77 0.0000 0.07 
Other 3 months -0.0004 -1.20 -0.0003 -1.09 -0.0001 -0.24 
Other 6 months -0.0004 -1.19 -0.0002 -1.10 -0.0001 -0.34 
Other 1 year -0.0004 -1.34 0.0000 -0.09 -0.0004 -1.11 
a and b The number of observations used in both purchases and sales 
regressions is 2769. 
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Panel C of Table 5 shows that the most profitable 
purchases come from top executives and officers. This is 
particularly true for both planned and non-planned 
purchases. The category of “other” insiders shows the least 
profitable purchases, especially over longer holding periods. 
For insider sales, directors appear to be engaging in most 
profitable 10b5-1 trades. Directors are closely followed by top 
executives and officers. Large shareholders and other 
insiders do not exhibit profitability at all. We also observe 
similar relations for non-planned sales across all types of 
insiders. 
V. DISCUSSION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our results indicate that insiders’ 10b5-1 plan trades 
under Rule 10b5-1 are highly profitable and typically similar 
in profitability to non-plan trades. Our evidence also shows 
that 10b5-1 plans are becoming more popular over time; the 
percentage of firms with at least one 10b5-1 transaction 
increased from 6% to 24% between 2003 and 2013. These 
findings are consistent with the conclusion that insiders are 
taking advantage of informational advantages while 
simultaneously hiding behind 10b5-1 plans to escape 
potential detection of their informed trades. This evidence 
supports the conclusion that it is necessary to rewrite the 
safeguards of the SEC’s safe harbor rule in order to prevent 
such abuse. 
We first propose that the SEC require a minimum, built-
in six-month delay on planned transactions after a plan is 
filed. Given that the profitability of an insider’s transactions 
extends into the six months following the date of the first 
trade, this additional delay of six months will increase the 
likelihood that any planned transactions will not benefit 
from this initial informational asymmetry. Most of the 
asymmetric information will be reflected in stock prices 
within six months. Some may argue that this requirement is 
too onerous because it does not allow insiders to trade at all, 
even for diversification reasons. However, this requirement 
does not affect the ability of insiders to trade outside of the 
10b5-1 Rule. If they desire, insiders can still buy or sell 
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immediately after setting up a plan; however, those 
transactions cannot receive the benefit of the safe harbor 
rule. 
Second, insiders can benefit from their informational 
advantages by subsequently modifying their plans. To 
prevent abuse, we propose that any modification to an 
existing plan must prompt a new built-in six-month trading 
delay. This requirement will again reduce the incentives for 
insiders to modify 10b5-1 plans as a result of gaining 
subsequent material non-public information. 
Third, we propose that the SEC rescind its grant of 
permission for the use of formulas, algorithms, or computer 
programs with safe harbor plans. Making safe harbor 
trading dependent on the market price of a company’s stock 
and allowing insiders to provide a formula or a computer 
program to determine trading activity actually increases 
insiders’ degree of freedom with respect to exploiting 
material non-public information. Instead, the SEC should 
require that plans contain only two elements: the number of 
shares to be purchased or sold, and the dates of these 
proposed transactions. The less discretion insiders have over 
the future course of their proposed transactions, the less 
they will be able to use their material non-public 
information. 
Fourth, we propose that all the details of a 10b5-1 plan 
must be disclosed at the time of the initial filing of the plan. 
Any subsequent modifications to a plan or subsequent 
cancellation of a plan must also be publicly disclosed. Public 
disclosure is necessary to ensure that (1) plans are not set up 
to exploit material, non-public information and (2) that 
investors can verify for themselves that insiders are 
following their own rules. In addition, such a public 
disclosure rule would also direct additional attention to any 
subsequent modification or cancellation of the plan, thereby 
reducing insiders’ incentives to use their informational 
advantages to effect such changes. 
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Some opponents may argue that such public disclosures 
are inconsistent with insiders’ right to privacy.54 Two 
arguments weigh against this line of reasoning. First, 
insiders and firms do not give up any business secrets by 
disclosing their supposedly non-information-related planned 
transactions. By definition, these trades should not contain 
any material information. Alternatively, if simple knowledge 
of the plan dates, quantities, and limit prices is sufficient to 
infer insiders’ material, non-public information, then these 
plans should not qualify for the safe harbor privilege. 
Second, existing SEC rules already require prior public 
disclosure of insiders’ planned sales of restricted or control 
shares.55 In this case, insiders must file a notice of proposed 
sale with the SEC on Form 144 if the sale involves more 
than 5000 shares or greater than $50,000 in any three-
month period.56 To address privacy concerns, similar small-
trade volume conditions could be added to our proposed 
disclosure requirements for Rule 10b5-1 trades as well. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This Article examines the profitability of insider 
transactions under Rule 10b5-1. One of the innovations of 
this study is its inclusion of all reported 10b5-1 trades. We 
find that, on average, insiders’ trades within Rule 10b5-1 
appear to be based on material non-public information. 
Moreover, the profitability of 10b5-1 plan trades is similar to 
the profitability of non-plan insider trades. 
To analyze how insiders might trade strategically within 
the rule, we examine a number of trade characteristics. We 
also identify insiders’ initial and subsequent trades, as well 
as their regular and irregular trades. Our results show that 
even initial trades under Rule 10b5-1 appear to be based on 
material non-public information, suggesting that insiders set 
 
54 Potential privacy concerns were relayed to us during our 
presentations of the paper by seminar participants. 
55 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(h) (2014). 
56 Id. 
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up their 10b5-1 plans to take into account material non-
public information. We also find that any irregularity with 
respect to trading intervals or trading volumes increases the 
profitability of insiders’ trades under Rule 10b5-1. This 
finding supports the conclusion that insiders modify or 
cancel their plans in response to acquiring subsequent 
material non-public information. 
Moreover, we examine the effects of Rule 10b5-1 on 
insider trading by trade volume, firm size, and insiders’ 
positions within the firm. We find that these variables 
provide additional clues to the profitability of insider trading 
for both planned and non-planned transactions. For instance, 
insiders’ non-10b5-1 planned purchases tend to be positively 
related to the trading volume. The 10b5-1 planned purchases 
show similar, but somewhat weaker, relations between 
abnormal returns and trading volume. Profitability of 
insiders’ sales (both planned and non-planned), particularly 
as measured by long-term abnormal returns (one year), is 
positively related to trading volume. These findings suggest 
that insiders increase trading volume when they possess 
material non-public information. 
Furthermore, while both 10b5-1 planned and non-
planned purchases by insiders seem to be most profitable in 
small firms, the relationship between insiders’ sales and firm 
size is weaker for both 10b5-1 planned and non-planned 
sales. High-ranking officers seem to earn the greatest 
abnormal returns on their non-planned purchases among the 
insider types. Directors earn the next most abnormal 
returns, followed by officers and large shareholders. For 
officers, both 10b5-1 planned and non-planned purchases 
seem to be most profitable. The insider type “other” shows 
the least profitable planned purchases. Directors’ 10b5-1 
planned sales seem to be the most profitable, followed by 
those of top executives and officers. Planned sales of “other” 
insiders do not show abnormal profits at all. Our analyses 
show similar patterns for non-planned sales across all types 
of insiders. 
Our evidence suggests that insiders take advantage of 
their material non-public information when they set up 
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10b5-1 plans and when they modify 10b5-1 plans. To prevent 
further abuse of 10b5-1 rules, we propose that the SEC 
institute four additional requirements to qualify under the 
safe harbor. First, any planned trades must have a minimum 
six-month required delay after the plan is filed. Second, any 
subsequent modifications to the plan will trigger a new six-
month delay period. Third, the SEC must repeal its 
permission of trades based on prices, formulas, and computer 
programs and insist that safe harbor plans should only 
contain two elements: trading quantities and dates of trade. 
Fourth, the details of the initial plan must be publicly 
disclosed to enable investors to verify that insiders are 
abiding by their own requirements. Similarly, any 
subsequent modifications or cancellation of the plans must 
also be publicly disclosed to increase attention to changes in 
these planned transactions. 
